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Abstract
In this paper we report on the results of a telephone survey conducted in Southern
California during August and September 1996.  The purpose of the survey was to inform
respondents about a set of rather complex pricing policies designed to reduce motor vehicle
emissions and to estimate respondent support for those policies.  After receiving extensive
information about these policies, respondents were polled on whether they would support, i.e.,
vote for, any or all of these options.
The pollution fee survey elicited support for a plan that levied a fee on vehicles in the
region, depending on the vehicle's emissions per mile and on the miles driven.  The sample was
then split in two, with half the respondents being told that a portion of the revenues would be
returned to the public in the form of reductions in motor vehicle fees or sales tax reductions,
and half told that these returns would be made in the form of coupons.
Nearly 40 percent of respondents agreed to support the base plan (42 percent of those
expressing an opinion).  More than 50 percent supported the fees with rebates, including
support of 54 percent when all the available revenues are returned to the public (57 percent of
the sample expressing an opinion).  Support for the coupon policy was intermediate between
the base and rebate policies, attracting 42 percent of the sample (45 percent of those
expressing an opinion).
Statistical analyses were performed on the data to explain the voting patterns observed.
Generally, the levels of support were significantly affected by the design features of the plans,
such as the size of the fee paid and the rebate, as well as by a host of socio-demographic and
perceptual variables, such as ethnicity, age, political affiliation, expected efficacy of the policy,
and the degree to which air pollution affects the respondent or his or her family.  Examination
of these statistical results may be useful in the development of pollution fee programs to
present to the public, as well as in the design of public information campaigns and the
allocation of marketing resources to win support for these programs.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
Despite intense regulatory efforts to reduce vehicle emissions over the past twenty
years, emissions from cars and trucks continue to be major source of air pollution problems in
urban areas of the U.S. [National Research Council, 1991].  Until the late seventies, the
principal approach to reducing vehicle emissions had been stringent new car emission
standards, enforced against the manufacturer.  Although the new car emission reductions have
been substantial, emissions from vehicles on the road continue to be a problem, with relatively
small numbers of cars with broken or deteriorated emissions equipment accounting for the
majority of the emissions [Bishop and Stedman, 1994].
Recognition of this divergence between new vehicle emission certification and actual
in-use emissions caused Congress to require vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M)
programs in the more polluted urban areas as part of the 1977 Clean Air Amendments.  At the
time, evidently, legislators envisioned emission inspection to be a straightforward extension of
vehicle safety inspection programs in operation in all the states and previously mandated by
federal legislation.  Many states, in fact, responded by tacking the I/M test onto the existing
safety inspection.
States were given wide latitude for designing their own inspection programs and a
variety of programs emerged.  However, by the late 1980s it had become clear that many of
the initial state programs, on which the EPA had placed such high expectations, were not
effectively reducing vehicle emissions and urban areas in many states were still not in
compliance with national clean air standards.
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When the Clean Air Act was amended in 1990, Congress required "enhanced I/M in the
most polluted urban areas, which required that states not set minimum repair limits at levels
less than $450 per car, promoted centralized testing system with a more rigorous and extensive
test procedure, and established strict restrictions on which cars were required to be tested.2
The EPA believed that the new Enhanced I/M would improve some of the technical difficulties
with the earlier tests and help to prevent at least some of the types of fraud.
These new regulations were to have been implemented by 1994, but there has been
such opposition to them in so many states that the EPA has backed away from the original
requirements that programs be centralized and use specific test technology.  Federal regulators
are considering more flexibility in how they allow states to comply with clean air statutes.
This paper considers the viability of one such option championed by economists [see
Harrington, McConnell, and Alberini, 1996; Harrington, Walls and McConnell, 1995; Kessler
and Schroeer, 1993; Eskeland and Devarajan, 1996; and Stephen Smith, 1995] -- a pollution
fee program where vehicles are charged a fee based on their emissions rate (grams per mile)
times their miles driven.  Such an approach (with an I/M program used solely for establishing
the emissions rate) has the potential to substantially increase economic welfare over current
regulatory policy for reducing vehicle emissions.  Under the current I/M policy motorists must
repair a vehicle if it does not pass the inspection, regardless of the benefits of doing so.  With
an emissions fee the motorist has a choice about whether to repair the vehicle and costly
repairs can be avoided if they are unlikely to produce significant emissions reductions.  Further
a pollution fee system can especially target vehicles that contribute the most emissions, i.e.,
that have a high emissions rate and high mileage, whereas IM programs treat all dirty vehicles
equally.
There are a number of objections to a fee system, not the least of which is that it is
unfair to high mileage drivers (it is reasoned that most miles are attributable to commuting,
where elasticity of travel demand is very low) and low income people (because they
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disproportionately own dirty vehicles).  To partly address these problems and to raise the
general political viability of a pollution fee system, some have suggested that revenues be
recycled to citizens of the affected area, in such a way as not to interfere with the incentives to
reduce polluting behavior.
In this paper we report on the results of a telephone survey sponsored by the REACH
Task Force3 and conducted in Southern California during August and September 1996.  This
survey was designed to estimate voting patterns in a hypothetical referenda concerning
alternative pollution fee policies with and without various revenue recycling options.
This is not the first survey to test for public support of pollution fees on vehicles
[J. Moore Methods, 1994; Godbe Research and Analysis, 1996].  However, it is unusual in
several respects.  First, it is quite explicit about the specific policy instrument that would be
implemented and links it to benefits it will bring (bad air days reduced from 120 to 60 per
year).  The latter estimates were developed in modeling exercises by contractors for the
REACH Task Force.  Previous surveys ask for support for very general policies ("to make
people pay for the emissions from their vehicles") or in combination or in sequence with
congestion policies (e.g., "use and impact fees" tested by J. Moore Methods, Inc.).  No prior
survey is devoted exclusively to this instrument and examines variations of it.
Second, the survey is also unusually explicit about the fate of the collected revenues,
and in particular it includes examination of policies that return varying portions of the revenues
to the public, either in the form of cash (through reductions in sales taxes and vehicle
registration fees or through income tax credits) or in the form of coupons to be used for
vehicle emissions equipment repair, transit, and the like.
Third, the fees are personalized to a degree, based on reported vehicle-miles-traveled
(VMTs) and on the age of the vehicle (the latter associated with higher emissions.  This
personalization required the use of a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) protocol.
Survey Development.  The survey was developed after extensive focus group testing
and in consultation with the REACH Task Force.  The draft instruments were then pre-tested.
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From Harrington and Krupnick [1996], which reports on the focus group results, we found
that the survey needed to include a section emphasizing the health effects of air pollution, a
section asking respondents about their support for an odometer reading plan and about a more
technology-intensive "pay-at-the-pump" approach, and the possibility that owners of low
mileage, clean cars could "make money" in the revenue recycling version of the pollution fee.
These factors were included in the final survey.  A number of other issues that seemed
important to focus group participants were not included in the survey, most notably a clear
statement about what programs would be put in place if the pollution fee program was not
implemented and whether this program would be a substitute for the enhanced I&M program
that California is slated to introduce.
Survey sampling.  The survey samples were stratified random samples of adults (age 18
or greater) in the 5-county region comprising the greater Los Angeles area.  Oversampling was
necessary to ensure adequate geographical coverage; we undersampled in Los Angeles County
and oversampled in the other four counties.  For each county, the number of completed
interviews and the sampling weights (persons represented by each respondent) are shown in
Table 1. We screened out anyone who did not own or lease a motor vehicle.  The excluded
adults might be expected to be more supportive of the fee policies, as they will not be paying
into the system but are likely to benefit from cleaner air and government spending of the
revenues.  After adjusting for the oversampling, the samples appear to resemble the population
of Southern California, with the exception that there appears to be an excess of persons over
age 65 (14% of respondents in the survey versus 11.6% of the population in the 5-county area).
Table 1.   Number of Interviews and Sampling Weights
    County Number of interviews Sampling weights
Los Angeles 473 15,136
Orange 453 4,560
Riverside 191 5,435
San Bernardino 263 4,381
Ventura 196 2,794Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -5-
Survey response data.  In total, 1,715 surveys were completed in the pollution fee
survey.  The cooperation rate, defined as the quotient of the total completed interviews and the
total viable contacts who have the potential to pass through the screeners and speak the
appropriate language, was 30 percent.  Provision was made for speakers of Spanish only, and
the number of interviews conducted in Spanish was 29 percent.  139 respondents were
dropped who failed to provide essential information on their miles driven.
II.   SURVEY  DESCRIPTION
The pollution fee survey consisted of four parts (see Figure 1).  In the first part the
interviewer elicited from the respondent information about their driving habits and their
vehicles as well as the degree to which air pollution bothers them and their families.
In the second part it was necessary to convey to the respondent a great deal of
information about the pollution fees:  information about the features of the basic plan, such as
the technology and uses of the revenues.  In order to keep the respondent engaged in the
interview process, we presented this information to respondents in questions of the form,
"Suppose X [e.g., 'dirty cars paid a higher rate than cleaner cars.'].  Would you be more or less
likely to support the fee policy?"  In addition, we wanted to remind respondents of the different
ways that people might respond to the fees, such as getting their vehicle repaired or driving a
cleaner vehicle more.  We presented this information as a series of questions structured as:
"Some people say that pollution fees will cause people to do X.  Do you think this will happen
most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?.
While the main function of these questions was to convey information to the
respondent, the answers are also available for analysis.  We found, however, that the responses
to the features of the plan are difficult to interpret.  For example, most of those opposed to the
base fee described themselves as "less likely' to support any given feature.  Such respondents
were apparently choosing the most negative category to the question and did not want the
interviewer to get the impression that they might support any feature of it.  The responses to
the "belief" questions appear to be more meaningful, and in general we found that those who-6- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
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thought the pollution fees would be effective at changing behavior were more likely to support
the policy.  It is difficult, however, to determine which is causing which.
Next, respondents were informed about possible ways in which the money could be
spent, again through questions meant to keep them involved in the phone survey.  They were
told that 16% of the funds would be spent on administration of the plan, and that the remaining
funds could be spent on new transit options, rebates of taxes or fees, and low income vehicle
repair programs
The third and most important part of the survey elicited opinions on several different
pollution fee policies.  The base plan was described to individuals using a set of questions
structured as:  "Would you be more or less likely to support the pollution fee if you knew
that...."  This structure was used instead of simply providing them a narrative because we felt
the former approach would be more involving.  These features include:
• the fee is based on the miles driven and the pollution per mile
• dirtier cars pay $0.05/mile, average cars pay $0.015/miles, and clean cars pay
$0.01/mile.4
• the vehicle's pollution per mile rating would be updated during the Smog Check
• the fees would be phased in over a three year period
The sample was then split, with each half asked for the likelihood of their support if
they knew that the fee would be figured by (a) having the odometer read or (b) having an
electronic system at the gas pump that would read the pollution rate from a chip on the vehicle
and charge on the basis of the gallons purchased.
Base Plan Vote.  The base plan carries the 5 cent/1.5 cent/1.0 cent per mile charges, as
described above and the feature that revenues are to be used "for regional government
pollution reduction programs and on public transportation alternatives in your area."  The
benefits of the plan are described in terms of reductions in unhealthy air days from 120 per year
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to 60 per year.  Such improvements are then linked to health and visibility improvements.  The
respondents are then told that if they continue driving as they do now they would pay a fee of
$X per year.  The fee is actually computed by multiplying the number of miles they say they
drive per year times 1.5 cents if the vehicle is no older than a 1980 model year, or 7 cents/mile
if the vehicle is older than 1980.  They are then asked whether they would be better or worse
off, whether they would vote for this plan on a ballot, whether they definitely or probably
support (or oppose) the plan, and, if they oppose, why.
Split Sample.  The sample is then split into two subsamples.  One subsample is asked
for their support of the base plan with a rebate in the form of reductions in various fees and
taxes.  The other subsample is asked for their support of the base plan with a rebate of coupons
rather than cash, where the coupons can be spent on auto repair, transit, and the like.
The Cash Rebate Plan.  The respondent is told that either 25%, 50%, or 84% of the
revenues will be returned to the "people of Southern California" through cutting vehicle
"registration and license fee and some local sales taxes."  The implication of these phrases is
that the revenues will not be returned to drivers in proportion to their pay-in.  The CATI
program assigns rebates of $23 for the 25% rebate, $46 for the 50% rebate, and $77 for the
84% rebate.  Respondents are then told that their fee, as before, is X dollars per year, but that
the rebate will save them Y dollars per year, so they would actually pay Z dollars per year on
net.  Finally, they are told that the tax/fee reduction plan would be implemented at the same
time as the pollution fee.  Then, they are asked for support (opposition) and the strength of
such support (opposition).  Then, they are asked for support/opposition to the same plan,
except that they would get a tax credit on their state income tax.
The Coupon Plan.  This plan, developed by COALESCE,5 is the same as the cash
rebate plan, except that instead of cash a percentage (25%, 50%, or 84%) of the revenues
would be returned in "the form of coupons good for the repair of polluting vehicles, as well as
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for the use of improved and convenient transportation alternatives, such as community shuttle
vans and express buses in your area."  The questions are in other respects identical to the cash
rebate plan.  Finally, an additional set of questions asks whether upon knowing various features
of the coupon plan, the respondent would be more or less likely to support the plan.  These
features include various transit options, plus redeeming the coupons for cash at a 50%
discount, building better park and drive lots, trading coupons in the market, and using coupons
for vehicle repairs.
The final part of the survey asked a set of standard demographic questions:  age,
marital status, education, family composition, work status and income, as well as for additional
information on vehicles and driving.
III.   DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS
Table 2 provides statistics on the key dependent and independent variables used in the
study.  The CATI program must calculate the pollution fees, the rebates, and the net fees.  The
pollution fee calculations are based on miles traveled and the age of the vehicle, while the
rebates are determined by the percentage rebate chosen at random for the respondent.
Descriptive statistics for these key variables are shown on Table 2.  The average fee was $225,
with 2% of the sample given a fee greater than $1,000 and 21% of the sample given a fee of
$100 or less.  These estimates reflect the distribution of miles driven, which averaged slightly
over 12,000 per year, and the distribution of model years, of which 8% of the vehicles driven
by the respondents were produced before 1980.  The rebates and coupons averaged around
$50 in value.  Thus for both the cash rebate and coupon plans, the net fee averaged about
$180.  About 13% of the subsamples received a refund.  Note that the sample size is
approximately half for the cash rebate and coupon plans relative to the base plan.-10- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics (population-weighted)
Basic Plan
Average Fee = $225
N = 1574
Rebate Plan
Average Fee = $180
N = 767









Miles Driven Percent Model Year Percent
<5000 21 1990-1996 55
5001 - 10000 28 1980-1989 37
10001 - 15000 28 1970-1979 6
15001 - 20000 14 Pre-1970 2
20001 - 25000 4 Average Year 1989








Age 44 16 17 96
Republican 0.33 0.47 0 1
Asian 0.06 0.23 0 1
Hispanic 0.15 0.35 0 1
Air Pollution Effect (1-11 scale) 5.5 2.5 1 11
Response Beliefs* 1.32 0.75 1 3
Years Schooling 14.5 2.5 4 19




Household Size 2.7 1.5 1 12
Number of Children 0.7 1.1 0 6
Own/rent home 0.6 0.5 0 1
Number of Vehicles 2.1 1.1 1 7
Males 0.49 0.50 0 1
Odometer Method 0.5 0.5 0 1
* Of several questions on how respondent felt that people's behavior would be affected by the pollution fee (i.e., "drivers
would do [...] almost never (=1), some of the time (=2), most of the time (=3)," the question used in the analysis as
representative was "Drivers with at least two cars would drive their more polluting vehicle less and their cleaner vehicle
more."Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -11-
IV.  SUPPORT  FOR  THE  ALTERNATIVE  PLANS
For ease of comparison, the support and opposition to each of the policies examined
are shown in Figure 2.  As shown the base support for pollution fees is 39 percent, compared
to 53 percent opposed and 9% who did not express a preference.  Linking the fees to other
fee/tax reductions increases the support significantly, to 50 percent of respondents.  The
coupon proposal on average attracted somewhat more support than the base policy
(particularly if the "don't knows" are not counted), but not as much support as the tax/fee
rebate plan.  However, there were significant differences in the levels of support for the
different amounts of rebates/coupons distributed, as discussed further below.
Base Survey
As shown in Table 3, a solid majority (53 percent) opposes the base pollution fee
policy, with only 39 percent in favor.  If we consider the intensity of preferences, we see that a
much higher fraction of the opposers are "definites," suggesting that this policy enjoys soft
support and faces hard opposition.
Table 3.  Support for Base Pollution Fee Policy
Support Oppose Don't Know
39% 53% 9%
Definite Probable Probable Definite
15% 24% 16% 37% 9%
Although support for other policies is stronger, the respondent's attitude toward this
base question is by far the best predictor of the response to those other policies.  This point can
be illustrated by the data in Table 4, a cross-tabulation of support for the base policy and the
combined pollution fee/tax reduction.-12- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
Figure 2.Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -13-
Table 4.  Importance of Base Policy
Support pollution fees with tax reductions?
Support base policy? Œ No Yes Don't know
No 75% 20% 5%
Yes 9% 87% 4%
Don't know 11% 63% 26%
Average support for fees/tax reduction 44% 49% 7%
The rows of Table 4 can be thought of as the conditional support for the fees with tax
reductions given respondents' support or opposition to the base policy.  Thus, among
opponents of the base policy, 75 percent oppose the fees combined with tax reductions.  An
even higher percentage of base fee supporters -- 87 percent -- support fees with tax reductions.
The fact that 20 percent of base fee opponents change their vote, compared to only 9 percent
of supporters, is the reason that support for the fees with tax reductions is higher than support
for the base policy.
Explaining base fee support.  To aid in the design of a policy that will garner
significant public support, the factors that influence the votes need to be understood.
Attitudinal factors can be elicited directly, while other factors can be examined through
statistical analyses, such as multivariate regressions.  When the opposers were polled on their
reason for opposition, the category with the highest response rate (22%) was "Just a tax
increase," followed by "Doesn't trust or believe the government" (18%).
A large number of more concrete factors can be reasonably hypothesized to affect
support for the base policy.  To isolate the influences on support, we estimate a set of probit
regression equations.  The estimated dependent variable in this equation can be interpreted as
the probability that an individual with the given characteristics will support the policy, and the
coefficients on the independent variables indicate their influence on the probability of support.
The results of these estimations are shown in Table 5.-14- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
Table 5.   Probit Regression Results for Voting on the Basic Plan.
                (Standard error in parentheses)



































































-0.603 -0.600 -0.599 -0.595
Sample Size 1355 1355 1355 1355
We used two specifications (I and II): one in which the pollution fee paid is an
independent variable, another where the factors used to calculate the fees are variables, i.e., the
miles driven and whether the car is a pre-1980 model.  Each of these factors influence support,
e.g., the higher the fee paid, the lower the probability of support; or alternatively, the more
miles driven and driving a pre-1980 vehicle, are associated with a lower probability of support.
In addition, we found, after a reasonably thorough search of independent variables, that
younger respondents, Democrats and Independents, and Asians and Hispanics are more likely
to support the base plan.  Two other variables were always significant.  If a respondent rated
him- or herself or their family as highly bothered by air pollution, they were more likely toPublic Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -15-
support the plan.  In addition, if the respondent believed that many people would respond to
the fees in the ways suggested to them in the survey, they were more likely to support the plan.
This result leads to the tentative conclusion that an effective campaign to educate the public on
the benefits and mechanics of pollution fees may produce dividends.  Finally, two other
variables appear to influence support, but need further discussion (see below).  The first is the
effect of region of residence on support, where respondents living in LA appear to have a
higher propensity to support the base plan.  The second is that respondents with less schooling
are more likely to support the plan.
County Support.  Table 6 provides estimates of support for the base plan by county of
residence.  Except for Los Angeles, where support is significantly higher than for the other
counties, there are small and insignificant differences in percentage support across the counties.
This lack of variation implies that the factors explaining the probability of support will not
include the county of residence, except possibly for Los Angeles.  Regional variables, to the
extent that they serve as proxies for regional differences in age, income, race, etc. might be
expected to influence support of the plan.  Such variables might also serve as proxies for
factors that we cannot measure within the survey, such as highway and transit access, distance
to place of work, and other characteristics.
Table 6.  Voting on Base Plan, By County (percentage)
Region Support Oppose Don't Know
Los Angeles 43 50 7
Orange 33 58 9
Riverside 36 53 12
San Bernardino 32 59 10
Ventura 32 58 10
We found that respondents living in Los Angeles were significantly more likely to
support the base plan than those living elsewhere when this factor alone was used to explain
support.  More revealing, even when this variable is used with the other explanatory variables-16- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
to explain support, a significant relationship is found (at the 6% level) (as shown in Table 5,
specifications III and IV).  This means that there are characteristics of Los Angelenos not
already captured by factors included in the survey that influence support.  As for the other
counties, we infer from their similar degrees of support and lack of significance in the
regression analysis that either: (a) there are no county-specific influences on support not
otherwise captured in our analysis or (b) the county is too large and diverse a geographical unit
to discern such influences.
Schooling.  The survey presents a fairly complex program to individuals.  For this
reason we hypothesized that those with more education would understand and appreciate the
usefulness of the pollution fee concept more than those with less education.  In fact, we found
that those with less schooling evidenced far greater support for the base plan than those with
more schooling.  In particular, the difference in attitude was distinct between the group with a
high school education or less versus the more educated group.  We thought that perhaps
education was acting as a surrogate for income, but this was not found to be the case.  It also
could be a surrogate for miles driven, age, or sex.  But these hypotheses were also found
wanting.  Finally, we thought it could be a surrogate for commuting behavior, hypothesizing
that the noncommuters or transit users do mostly discretionary driving and therefore may have
felt that they could cut back their driving (and pay a lower fee) more easily than other groups.
In spite of the fact that those with at most a high school degree were far more likely than those
with more education to take a bus to work (by 59% to 41%) and of those in the less educated
group, a relatively large fraction did not commute.  Nevertheless, a variable representing the
"discretionary driving" group was insignificant in explaining voting patterns.  Further analysis
of this finding therefore appears warranted.
Insignificant Factors. Note that we used all of the appropriate variables available to us
in the survey to explain voting patterns, but that only those noted above were consistently
significant.  In particular, the respondent's household's income was NOT a significant factor in
explaining support.  If anything, the lowest income categories tend to be more supportive of
the policy (although such support is not statistically significant).  Other variables that werePublic Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -17-
generally insignificant include: household size, number of children, whether the home is owned
or not, the number of vehicles owned or leased by the household, and the sex of the
respondent.  Also, focus groups expressed a clear preference for the "pay at the pump" method
of collecting pollution fees.  However, in the survey support was not sensitive to whether the
respondent received the odometer or the pay at the pump "treatment."
Note that we did not think it appropriate to use answers to the "informational"
questions as explanatory (independent) variables.  These questions, of the form "would you be
more or less likely to support the policy if you knew that . . .", appear to be another way of
expressing support or opposition to the plan, not an independent measure of factors that could
explain such support or opposition.
Pollution Fees with Other Fee/tax Reductions
Table 3 above suggests that 50 percent of respondents favor the rebate alternative, but
a closer look at the subsamples of individuals presented with the cash rebate alternative
suggests that this support can vary significantly, depending on the amount of the rebate.  In
particular, support appears to increase with the amount of the rebate, where support, as
measured as a fraction of those providing an opinion, increases from 44% with a $23 rebate to
54% with a $77 rebate.6  Not counting the "don't knows," 57% of those receiving the $77
rebate said they would support the rebate plan.  While such an outcome might be unsurprising
if a given set of respondents were asked their opinions in a series of questions involving higher
and higher rebates, a much more powerful protocol was followed here where the subsample
receiving the rebate question was split randomly into three treatments, each receiving one of
the rebate amounts.  Thus, the increasing support is a result of independent trials and is a
strong indication of the sensitivity of support to the rebate amounts or percentages.
                                               
6 These estimates do not exactly match the raw scores for voting on the fee/tax reductions because adjustments
were necessary to correct for differences in the fraction of supporters of the base plan assigned the rebate
"treatments" for the rebate plan.  We used conditional probabilities to adjust the level of support to reflect the
support for the base policy in the overall sample.  These adjustments are made in all estimates of the rebate
support level used in this report.  Note that this problem is not present with the subsample assignments to the
coupon plan; hence no corrections to the raw scores were made.-18- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
The statistical significance of this relationship can be tested using probit regressions
where the net pollution fee replaces the pollution fee variable in the basic regressions on
Table 5, or where the rebate amount (or percentage) is added to the alternative specification in
Table 5.  The results (Table 7) reveal that these variables are highly significant in determining
the probability of support for the cash rebate.
Note that some ambiguity is present in the effect of the rebate on voting patterns
because respondents were presented with the rebate expressed in two ways -- as the
percentage of the revenues returned to the "people of Southern California" and as the dollar
amount to be returned to the respondent.  Thus, in Figure 2, note that the 25% rebate is also
expressed as a $23 return to the individual, and so on.  Because in our survey these two
measures are simply alternative ways of expressing the same rebate we cannot discern their
independent effects on voting patterns.
These analyses also reveal that the variables affecting support for the base plan also
affect support for the rebate plan.  Note, however, that the Los Angeles variable (LA) and the
schooling variable (HIGHSC=1 if a person has no higher degree than a high school diploma)
are no longer significant, although the schooling variable is significant at the 11% level.  The
result for county of residence is unsurprising in light of the crosstab (Table 8) showing that
support for the rebate is fairly similar across counties.7
The fact that the same set of variables influences support for both the cash rebate and
base plan while, at the same time, support for the rebate plan is significantly higher than for the
base plan, suggests that we examine the characteristics of those who switched from opposition
to the base plan to support of the cash rebate (and vice-versa).  We were unable to explain why
                                               
7 This change may have occurred because the sample size has shrunk approximately in half compared with that
for the base plan.  A possible way to augment the sample size and increase the power of the analysis is to re-
estimate these regressions with the full sample, setting the rebate amount to zero for all respondents who did
not receive the cash rebate question.  We find that the LA variable is still not significant, but that the other
variables have increased in significance owing to the larger sample size.Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -19-
Table 7. Probit Regression Results for Voting on the Rebate Plan.






































Mean Log Likelihood -0.614 -0.605
Sample Size 683 683
Table 8.  Voting on Rebate Plan, By County (percentage)
Region Support Oppose Don't Know
Los Angeles 51 43 6
Orange 47 48 4
Riverside 46 43 12
San Bernardino 50 42 8
Ventura 46 47 6-20- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
respondents switched from support of the base plan to opposition to the cash rebate.  But, very
few respondents are in this category.  We found, however, that of those opposed to the base
plan, the "switchers" (those who also support for rebate plan) are more likely to be female,
favor both tax rebates and public spending on transportation, get larger rebates, travel fewer
miles, and drive newer vehicles.
Finally, it is useful to consider a comparison of the strength of support among the
subsample who received both the base plan and the cash rebate plan (Table 9).  Two-thirds of
the subsample did not change their opinion.  The largest gains were made in the definitely
support category, which increased from 13% to 23% from the base to the rebate plan.  The
largest contributors to this increase came from the group who "probably supported" the base
plan and those who "didn't know" whether they supported or opposed the base plan.  Indeed,
63% of this "don't know" group registered support for the cash rebate while only 11%
registered opposition (with the rest still saying they "didn't know."  Finally, while only 7% of
those who were definitely opposed to the base plan supported the rebate, 42% of those who
probably opposed the base plan supported the rebate.  Thus, we might consider that all but
about one-third of the population is a reasonable target for building support for a rebate plan.
Pollution Fees with Coupons Returned
Of the subsample who received both the base and the coupon plans, 42 percent of
respondents favor the coupon alternative, while 40 percent favor the base plan.  This is not a
statistically significant difference.  The poor performance of this plan can be expected on
theoretical grounds (the lack of fungibility of coupons relative to cash), and was borne out in
the focus group sessions.  Nevertheless, support for the coupon plan appears to increase
somewhat with the amount of coupons distributed.  A crosstab of support/opposition to the
coupon plan with the amount of the coupons rebated (Table 10) reveals that a higher fraction
of the subsample favor the plan when they receive either $46 or $77 worth of coupons than
when they receive $23 worth (43-44 percent versus 40 percent, respectively).Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -21-































































































































































Table 10.  Voting on Coupon Plan, in percent
Value of Coupons Support Oppose Don't Know
$23 40 56 4
$46 44 47 9
$77 43 53 4-22- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
A more conclusive test of support for the coupon rebate plan can be made by running
probit regressions with specifications similar to those used for the cash rebate plan.  These
results, summarized in Table 11, show that the rebate is insignificant in explaining support
unless the sample receiving both the $46 and the $77 rebate is combined and compared to that
receiving the $23 rebate.
Table 11. Probit Regression Results for Voting on the Coupon Plan.


























































Mean Log Likelihood -0.604 -0.599 -0.598
Sample Size 720 720 720Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -23-
The probit regressions also reveal that, with the exception of political affiliation, the
factors that were found to influence support of the cash rebate and the base plan also influence
support for the coupon plan.  As for the rebate plan, Los Angelenos are not more likely to
support the coupon plan than those living in other counties, although this factor is almost
significant at the 10% level.  However, as shown in Table 12, not holding other things equal,
this group is much more likely than respondents from other counties to support the plan, with
San Bernardino residents much less likely to support it.
Table 12. Voting on Coupon Plan, By County (percent)
Region Support Oppose Don't Know
Los Angeles 46 48 6
Orange 40 56 4
Riverside 41 54 5
San Bernardino 31 63 6
Ventura 37 57 6
While the "switchers" commanded our attention in comparing responses to the base
and rebate plans, the issue is less important here because the switching is more balanced.  That
is, about 15% of those opposed to the base plan supported the coupon plan, but 12% of those
supporting the base plan opposed the coupon plan.  At the same time, the phenomenon that
those who did not vote on the base plan tended to support the cash rebate is evidenced for
coupons, as well, albeit to a lesser degree.  That is, whereas the "don't knows" for the base
plan favored the rebate 6:1, this ratio falls to 2:1 for the coupon plan.  Put another way, 46%
of the "don't knows" for the base plan supported the coupon plan and 22% opposed it.
The survey permits some probing into why opposing respondents didn't like the coupon plan.
The modal reason was "other" (30%), followed by "no reason."  These responses suggest that
some people did not understand the concept.-24- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
IV.   IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  SURVEY
The survey results clearly indicate that pollution fees on motor vehicles in southern
California can attract majority public support.  We have found that this support can be
significantly enhanced by returning at least some of the revenues in the form of tax reductions.
Offering larger rebates and lower pollution fees can further enhance support.  Offering rebates
in the forms of coupons garners less support than offering cash.  The results also indicate
where (both geographically and demographically) support and opposition to these plans may
be found to aid in targeting publicity and informational campaigns.
There are several "public support" issues that remain to be explored in furthering the
design of viable pollution fee plans.  First, we do not know whether support is more sensitive
to the percentage of revenues returned to the people or to the actual amount returned to the
individual.  Second, we do not know why those with less schooling and those who are
Hispanic (and to a lesser extent Asian) appear to favor the plans disproportionately.  Third, we
do not have confidence that individuals voting on the coupon and rebate plans fully understood
that in these alternative less money would be available for public investments in transportation
or pollution control.  And fourth, the weighting of survey results by population across the
counties does not correct for the tilt in the sample towards older (>65) respondents.  The
sample fraction is 14 percent while the five-county fraction is 11.6%.  As older respondents are
more likely to oppose the pollution fee plans, correcting for this tilt should slightly increase the
estimates of support.  Fifth, we were not able to examine how support might vary with details
of the cash rebate plans.  For instance, the precise way in which the rebate might be distributed
(more than proportionally to poor households or to long distance commuters) and the precise
form of the rebate (e.g., through vehicle registration fees alone, as opposed to some
unspecified combination of such fees and "sales tax reductions") might affect support and help
design a better rebate system.
Finally, we do not know the extent to which one overarching issue influenced results.
This issue is the "counterfactual" to the pollution fee plan, that is, the plan that would be in
effect if the pollution fee plan were not implemented.  It is our contention that the pollution feePublic Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results -25-
plan is a substitute for an inspection and maintenance program, such as southern California's
Smog Check I or II, although the inspection stations would still be needed to measure emission
rates.  Because Smog Check II was not yet implemented in Southern California, we could not
test the effect on voting in the survey of specifying this change in policy.  One can also
question whether additional policies on existing vehicle emissions would be needed beyond
Smog Check II in the even the pollution fee is not implemented.  Not suggesting a
counterfactual policy is likely to bias voting on the pollution fee policy, but the direction of
bias depends on the attractiveness of the counterfactual policy.  For instance, if one believes
that the pollution fee policy is more cost-effective (less costly) and flexible than the
counterfactual policy, then the observed support will underestimate support for the pollution
fee plan.  We expect that this is the appropriate direction of bias for a Smog Check II
counterfactual.-26- Krupnick, Harrington, and Alberini
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